

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:	Propulsion/Mechanical	FUNCTIONAL CRIT:	1
SUBSYSTEM:	Helium Inject	PHASE(S):	a, b
REV & DATE:	J, 12-19-97	HAZARD REF:	P.02, P.06,
DCN & DATE:			S.11
ANALYSTS:	E. Flauss/H. Claybrook		

FAILURE MODE: Leakage (External)

FAILURE EFFECT: a) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to fire/explosion.
b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to fire/explosion.

TIME TO EFFECT: Seconds

FAILURE CAUSE(S): A: Structural Failure of Check Valve (Downstream Valves Only)
B: Seal Leakage
C: Structural Failure of Clamp
D: Fracture of One Attachment Screw

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Allows flow of helium from facility to LO2 feedline during loading; prevents backflow of LO2/GO2 when helium inject system is inactive.

<u>FMEA ITEM CODE(S)</u>	<u>PART NO.</u>	<u>PART NAME</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>EFFECTIVITY</u>
2.4.19.2	47L1-1	Check Valve (See Note) (Downstream Only)	2	LWT-54 & Up

REMARKS: These 2 check valves are the same downstream check valves listed in FMEA (and CIL) 2.4.19.1. They are analyzed and described separately here due to the criticality 1 effect of leaking LO2/GO2. Redundancy does not apply to this failure mode.

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)
CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM: Propulsion/Mechanical
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FMEA ITEM CODE(S): 2.4.19.2

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RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

Two check valves and one filter are connected in series as one assembly and two of these assemblies are connected in parallel. The parallel paths provide redundancy and protection against a check valve failing to open. The series connected check valves provide redundancy for failure to close after ground umbilical separation.

- A: The valve housings are fabricated from 304L CRES and were designed to operate to 3000 psi between -320°F and +350°F. During ET operation the valves (housings) are used in the helium inject system at 750 psig and ambient to LO2 temperature (-297°F). The valves have been designed to meet the required yield (1.5) and ultimate (2.0) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188). Materials selected in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 and controlled per MMMA Approved Vendor Product Assurance Plan assures conformance of composition, material compatibility and properties.
- B: The teflon gasket prevents leakage between the valve mating parts. Material selected in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 and controlled per MMMA Approved Vendor Product Assurance Plan assures conformance of material composition and properties. Compatibility for oxygen service is specified per (MHB 8060.1). 100% inspection of valve components is specified and assures no damage to seals or mating surfaces. Joint torque is specified on the check valve assembly drawing and lockwire is specified to preclude disengagement.
- C: The clamp is fabricated from 304 CRES sheet. Material was selected in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures conformance of composition and properties.
- C, D: Attachment screws were selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500), installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on engineering drawings.

TEST:

The check valve is qualified as a subassembly of the helium inject filter/check valve assembly. Reference COQ MMC-ET-TM06-099.

Qualification: Qualification testing was performed partially at the check valve assembly level and filter check valve assembly level. The latter assembly includes a filter connected in series with two downstream check valves and appropriate sealing elements.

Valve Assembly: Testing of two valves included proof pressure at 4500 psig, external leakage, internal leakage at ambient and -300°F, and cracking/reseat cycles at -300°F and +400°F.

Filter/Valve Assembly: Further testing for acceptance with the check valves installed in the filter/check valve assembly configuration included proof pressure at 4500 psig, external leakage at 3000 psig, and internal leakage at 50 psig. Other testing included sine and random vibration, post vibration external leakage at 3000 psig, internal leakage at ambient and -300°F and cracking/reseat pressure cycles at -300°F, ambient, and +400°F. External leakage met criteria for no bubbles (MMC-ET-RA09-20).

MPTA Firings/Tankings: Two helium inject filter/check valve assemblies have been installed on MPTA. One assembly (two check valves) has accumulated 62.5 minutes of firing time and 27 cryogenic cycles. The second assembly has accumulated 22.5 minutes of firing time and 9 cryogenic cycles. There was no evidence of leakage due to operation or environment.

Acceptance:

Vendor - (Check Valve):

- A, B: Perform proof pressure and external leakage tests (TM545 Circle Seal).

Vendor - (Filter/Check Valve Assembly):

- A, B: Perform proof pressure and external leakage tests (TM545 Circle Seal).

MAF - (Vehicle Assembly):

- A, B: Perform leakage test (MMC-ET-TM04k).

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INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection - Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, C, D: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80921011936, and Standard drawings 47L1 and 26L17).
- B: Inspect for freedom of mating surface defects (drawings 32860 and 34173, Circle Seal).
- B: Verify assembly/torque (CSC/CCD-700, Circle Seal).

Lockheed Martin Procurement Quality Representative:

- B: Witness proof pressure and external leakage tests (TM545, Circle Seal).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- B: Inspect seal surfaces for freedom of nicks, radial scratches or other imperfections during installation (drawing 80921011941).
- B: Inspect (visually) sealing surfaces for freedom of nicks, radial scratches or other imperfections during installation (drawing 80921011941).
- A-D: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80921011941).
- A, B, D: Witness leakage test (MMC-ET-TM04k).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.